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SYMPOSIUM ON INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING
THE INFORMATION REGULATION OF BUSINESS ACTORS
Kishanthi Parella*
A transnational legal order (TLO)1 is emerging regarding the role of businesses in respecting human rights. This
legal order includes multistakeholder initiatives, international organization recommendations and guidelines,
NGO certifications, and other voluntary instruments.2 Many of the norms within this TLO are nonbinding
and therefore lack mandatory compliance; what they may possess is persuasive power, particularly when the
norms are developed, endorsed, and managed by reputable organizations. It is that reputational, or legitimacy,
advantage that matters for encouraging industry associations to comply with the nonbinding norms associated
with these organizations. Industry associations and other business actors will gravitate more towards legitimacy
enhancing organizations when their own legitimacy is at stake. They pivot towards public organizations such as the
United Nations or private NGO initiatives like the Rainforest Alliance, seeking to associate themselves publicly
with these organizations that enjoy more perceived legitimacy. These business relationships with legitimizing bod-
ies can take the form of partnerships, certifications, or other arrangements where an industry association adopts
and incorporates nonbinding norms when it otherwise might not. In this essay, I discuss three transnational legal
processes that encourage industry associations, their members, and other business actors to abide by nonbinding
transnational legal norms concerning business and human rights.
Promoting Nonbinding Transnational Norms Through Priming, Pivoting, and Identity Struggle
Priming, pivoting, and identity struggle are all related transnational legal processes that encourage industry asso-
ciations and business actors to incorporate nonbinding transnational norms into their policies and practices.
Priming refers to creating conditions for an association’s willingness to change its practices. Pivoting occurs when
an association develops closer ties to public organizations or private NGOs, often adopting nonbinding norms
associated with these organizations. Identity struggles occur when an industry association or other business actor tries
to change its identity to appear more legitimate in public perception.
At the international level, transnational institutions create information effects that prime industry associations
or other business actors for change. For example, the Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1 Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Schaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3, 15 (Terence C. Halliday &
Gregory Schaffer eds., 2015).
2 See, e.g., John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and
Remedy” Framework 4, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011); Our Strategy, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT; OECD, OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011).
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Human Rights adopted the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises (TNCNorms) in August 2003. The TNCNorms raised several concerns among cer-
tain industry associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and International Organization
of Employers (IOE). Those associations expressed concern that the TNC Norms represented a shift in human
rights obligations from state actors to private actors.3 The debate over the TNC Norms created important
information effects regarding the conduct and attitudes of the ICC, IOE, and other business actors that helped
to prime these actors for cooperation with subsequent nonbinding tools on business and human rights.4
At the domestic level, civil lawsuits and government investigations can also prime transnational business actors
for voluntary organizational change and encourage their pivot towards transnational nonbinding law. News of
government investigations communicates information to stakeholders regarding character attributes and financial
risks of the business actors under investigation, thereby serving a priming function and rendering that business
actor more willing to engage in organizational change to reestablish its perceived legitimacy. We see these dynamics
at work in the government investigation of several individuals associated with Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (“FIFA”).5 This investigation created an environment conducive for pivoting by FIFA
because it fostered a legitimacy crisis for FIFA that subsequently grew into a financial crisis. Scandals are not
new for FIFA but the government investigation appears to have created a unique legitimacy crisis for the trans-
national organization.6
Priming only influences the susceptibility or willingness of an organization to change its practices; it does not
guarantee that the organizational change will be a socially desired one. The type of organizational change we can
expect is influenced by which organizations an association pivots towards. Pivoting occurs when an association (or
other business actor) tries to copy another organization. Pivoting is important because the organization towhich an
association pivots can serve as a template for organizational change within that pivoting association or itsmembers.
Pivoting is important because the organizations towards which an association pivots may have limited ability to
influence the association otherwise. A pivoting association may borrow institutional practices from the organiza-
tion it is pivoting towards butmay not do sowithout a legitimacy crisismotivating it.Outside actors can have limited
capacity to command a particular association or other business actor to incorporate and enforce the nonbinding
policies, practices, and guidelines ofmultistakeholder initiatives, NGOs, theUnitedNations, and so forth. All these
organizations lack coercive capability; what they do possess is legitimacy. When confronted with a legitimacy crisis,
business actors may pivot towards these noncoercive organizations in order to enhance their own legitimacy.7
3 Int’l Chamber of Com., Joint Views of the IOE and ICC on the Draft “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” 2 (Nov. 24, 2003).
4 Emily Rabin, In the Hot Seat: Shell VP Robin Aram, GREEN BIZ (June 21, 2004) (explaining that industry opposition to theNorms created
certain reputational costs because it “‘linked business with a perception of hostility to human rights’”); David Kinley et al., The Politics of
Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations, 25 CO. & SEC. L.J. 30, 41 (2007); Alison
Maitland, Problem that Is Gaining Higher Political Profile, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2004) (explaining that the debate over the Norms drew attention
to the issue of the role of the business sector in protecting human rights).
5 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and
Corruption (May 27, 2015).
6 FIFA, 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT 1 (Dec. 2, 2015). It also experienced significant financial loss following the scandal due
to withdrawn support from corporate sponsors. Martyn Ziegler, Sponsorship exodus leaves Fifa $550m short of revenue target, THE TIMES (Feb. 26,
2016).
7 See Alex Bitektine, Legitimacy-Based Entry Deterrence in Inter-Population Competition, 11 CORP. REPUT. REV. 73, (2008) (“[W]hen two orga-
nizations are linked through a transaction, partnership or public endorsement, the legitimacy ‘ flows ’ through such a link from the more
legitimate to a less legitimate organization.”).
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For example, following the debate over the TNC Norms, the UN Special Representative on Business and
Human Rights, John Ruggie, introduced a tripartite framework for business and human rights known as the
“Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework” (Ruggie Framework).8 The Framework was followed by the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that provides guidance on implementing the Framework.9
The ICC and IOE engaged with the Ruggie Framework and the UN Guiding Principles in a more cooperative
manner compared to their hostility to the Norms.10 Other industry associations also developed their own strat-
egies for implementing the Ruggie Framework and the Guiding Principles. For example, IPIECA, the global oil
and gas industry association, created a manual for implementing operational-level grievance mechanisms in the oil
and gas industry and used the effectiveness criteria provided in the UN Guiding Principles.11 In this way, UN
norms indirectly contribute to transnational legal ordering through their impact on industry positions and
practices.
Similarly, FIFA pivoted towards the United Nations amidst the government investigations that were compro-
mising its legitimacy. In December 2015, it requested that John Ruggie recommend strategies for how FIFA could
embed human rights norms throughout its operation.12 By pivoting toward the UnitedNations to enhance its own
legitimacy, FIFA set itself up to borrow institutional practices from that organization.13 FIFA may not have piv-
oted towards the United Nations on its own; however, the reputational and financial consequences following the
government investigation, along with continuing criticism regarding its human rights practices, facilitated FIFA’s
pivot towards the United Nations.14 We have yet to see what comes from this pivot and what steps FIFA takes
based on these recommendations for improving its human rights practices. Yet this episode illustrates the complex
relationship of national and international public organizations with transnational associations and their governing
norms and practices.
Finally, pivoting away from one organization and towards another often involves an identity struggle for an
association as it tries to distance itself from its old identity that was delegitimized and solidify its new identity;
this identity struggle also fosters organizational change in accordance with nonbinding transnational law
norms. Identities inform the choices that organizations make, especially when there are significant reputational
and financial consequences of that identity formation. These identity struggles can lead to organizational changes
within an association or other business actor as well as shifts between these organizations.15
8 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises), Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
9 Ruggie, supra note 2.
10 Kishanthi Parella, Treaty Penumbras, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 275 (2017).
11 See generally, IPIECA, COMMUNITYGRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY: MANUAL FOR IMPLEMENTING OPERATIONAL-
LEVEL GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS AND DESIGNING CORPORATE FRAMEWORKS (2015) (providing a practical guide to aid planning and imple-
menting operational-level community grievance mechanisms).
12 FIFA, Press Release, FIFA to further develop its human rights approach with international expert John Ruggie (Dec. 14, 2015).
13 Id.; John Ruggie, “For the Game. For the World.” FIFA and Human Rights 29–35 (April 2016) (providing recommendations for
improving human rights practices).
14 See, e.g., Matthew Futterman, FIFAHasWork to Do in Human Rights, WALL ST. J (Apr. 14, 2016) (“FIFA has come under attack in recent
years because the organization and the host countries of its marquee event, the World Cup, have conducted businesses in ways that at times
do not conform with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”).
15 See Sarah Dadush, Industry Associations and Transnational Governance (working draft), at 25 (discussing “identity conflicts”within industry
associations).
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For example, in 2016, FIFA filed a request for restitution arguing that it was the victim of the corruption caused
by many of its former leaders, and requested restitution for the reputational harm and other financial costs asso-
ciated with the corruption scandal.16 This request was not just about money but also about identity as the “claim
seeks to cement FIFA’s place as a victim in the eyes of both prosecutors and the public and to telegraph the orga-
nization’s distance from generations of disgraced leaders.”17 It used the restitution request to communicate to the
public a division within FIFA between the parties responsible for the corruption and the rest of the organization.
This victim narrative was important because in order to retain this image—particularly to a doubtful global audi-
ence—FIFA had to take action consistent with this narrative. These are the institutional constraints created by an
identity struggle.
Implications
Negative reputational consequences can drive industry actors toward nonbinding instruments in order to
redeem their reputations. These processes of priming, pivoting, and identity struggle have implications for how
we imagine the relationship between different governance strategies in the transnational context. First,
reputational costs are still imposed by governance strategies that otherwise “fail,” such as treaty negotiations
that break down or civil lawsuits that are dismissed.18 These processes and the battles contained within them
can create reputational costs and information effects that encourage industry associations and their members
to pivot towards nonbinding instruments. These pivoting functions may necessitate reevaluation of the metrics
we use to determine whether a particular governance strategy “failed” to facilitate a socially desirable outcome.
Second, many types of governance strategies, at both the domestic and international level, create reputational
costs for business actors. Business actors may be more likely to change when they are subject to reputational costs
imposed by multiple governance strategies because the combination of reputational costs produced by these dif-
ferent strategies can increase the pressure for reform. Additionally, the reputational costs produced may also vary
by governance strategy, therefore offering business actors different incentives for change—an issue that calls for
further research.
16 FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION’S VICTIM STATEMENT AND REQUEST FOR
RESTITUTION 4, 22 (Mar. 15, 2016).
17 Rebecca Ruiz, FIFA, Embracing Role as Victim, Seeks to Collect Millions in U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016).
18 Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2018).
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